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Abstract 
We examine the debt maturity structure of Chinese listed companies during a period when the 
bond market was under-developed and the majority of commercial banks were owned by the 
state. We find that the type of ownership control affects the debt maturity structure. 
Compared to privately controlled enterprises, state-controlled companies had greater access 
to long-term debt and used less short-term debt during the sample period 2001–2008. The 
empirical results also show that company profitability was an important concern when 
Chinese banks allocated loans to listed companies, which meant that they became de facto 
monitors of listed companies during China’s transition process. However, although the 
financial reform process has increased the motivation of banks to consider company 
profitability in their lending decisions, the effect of profitability on the debt maturity structure 
is confounded because of state ownership being a  big weight in bank lending decision. 
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1. Introduction 
In contrast to most developed countries, China has not yet established sophisticated and 
mature capital markets to support the funding requirements of companies and entrepreneurs. 
According to data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the total value of bank 
loans is 100 times greater than the value of stocks and corporate bonds (Cai et al., 2008), such 
that bank loans are the main source of corporate financing in China. The four largest state-
owned banks: Bank of China (BOC), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), 
China Construction Bank (CCB) and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) dominate the 
Chinese banking sector, and during the period of our study, controlled around three quarters 
of all banking assets (Allen et al., 2005; Berger et al., 2009). The China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) controls lending by assigning quotas to each of the major banks and 
uses the Reserve Requirement Ratio (RRR) to further limit the funds a bank is able to lend.  
Until the late 1990s, the Chinese banking sector had little latitude, and could only serve as 
a conduit for channelling low-cost capital to state owned enterprises (SOEs). This was 
because SOEs were expected to assume the task of employment and social welfare provision. 
Privately controlled firms were virtually excluded from the formal credit market. In 1997, 
due to the increasing importance of the private sector in employment creation and economic 
growth, the government formally allowed banks to extend loans to private firms for the first 
time (Firth et al., 2009). Nonetheless, a close relationship between SOEs and the state owned 
banks remains, and, with loans priced below market clearing rates, SOEs obtain preferential 
access to credit. This discrimination problem is documented by Brant and Li (2003), Allen et 
al. (2005), and Firth et al. (2009), and discussed widely in the popular press e.g. South China 
Morning Post (2013), China Economic Review (2013) and The Wall Street Journal (2013). 
The state is able to influence bank lending for the benefit of SOEs through the regulatory 
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system, the power to appoint senior managers in the banks, and by exercising their right as 
controlling equity shareholder.  
Cai et al. (2008) investigate the determinants of debt maturity structure and find that high-
quality Chinese firms employ a higher proportion of long-term debt. They note that this 
contradicts the signalling theory proposed by Flannery (1986) and much of the empirical 
literature, and conclude that short term debt may not signal a firm’s good quality in China. 
Cai et al. (2008) also consider a proxy for a firm’s growth prospects and obtain ambiguous 
results regarding its impact on debt maturity structure. Accordingly, they find inconclusive 
support for agency theories of debt maturity structure relating to the control of managerial 
incentives to over- and under-invest in the firm’s activities. However, in a material omission 
from their study, Cai et al. (2008) do not distinguish firms that are privately owned from 
firms that are state owned. 
The debt maturity structure of Chinese listed firms depends on both supply-side and 
demand-side factors. The supply-side factors include the willingness of state owned banks to 
lend, while the firm’s preference for using short- or long-term debt constitutes a demand-side 
factor. Privately owned and state owned firms differ in both respects. SOEs have greater 
access to bank loans. The firm’s preference for employing short- or long-term debt is 
predicted by existing agency and signalling theories, however the differing ownership 
structures may influence their application. This follows because agency theory is predicated 
on the assumption that maximisation of shareholder wealth is the primary objective of 
decisions by a firm’s management. For SOEs, a social or policy objective may be paramount. 
Similarly, signalling theory presumes that banks play a monitoring role and the decision to 
lend to a firm provides the market with a credible signal as to the firm’s quality. However, 
the market is unlikely to regard the decision to lend to SOEs as a credible signal of quality 
given that the decision may not be entirely based on creditworthiness. 
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We examine the relationship between ownership control types and debt maturity structure 
for Chinese A share firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen securities exchanges over the 
period 2001 – 2008. We extend the existing literature in three respects. First, we find that 
SOEs employ more long term debt than their privately owned counterparts.  This is consistent 
with the problem of state banks discriminating against private firms in providing credit, that 
Brant and Li (2003) document, extending to discrimination in the maturity of the loans the 
banks offer. Second, we show that during our sample period, profitability has greater 
importance in determining the access of privately owned firms to long-term debt than is the 
case with SOEs. Third, we find that SOEs located in less-developed regions tend to employ 
more long-term debt, in contrast to their private counterparts that use short-term debt. 
Cognizant of the Li et al. (2009) demonstration that the ability of unlisted firms to access to 
bank finance varies by region, these findings favour the dominance of supply-side constraints 
in explaining the differing debt maturity structures of SOEs and privately owned listed firms 
in China. 
The remainder of this study is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant literature 
and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes sample selection and variable construction; 
Section 4 presents the method and empirical results; Section 5 reports the results of the 
robustness tests from different dimensions; and Section 6 concludes the research. 
 
2. Literature and hypotheses development 
In developed economies, banks conduct credit analysis to screen applicants and structure 
their lending according to their assessment of the applicant’s risk. In China, such lending 
practices are likely to apply more to privately owned firms. State-owned banks may perceive 
private firms to be more risky, as the banks are less likely to be compensated through 
recapitalisation by the state1 if the quality of these loans deteriorates (Lu, Zhu and Zhang, 
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2012). In line with this perception of risk, state-owned banks lending to private firms will 
prefer to provide short-term funds that have lower default risk than longer-term loans to the 
same firms.  
The lending quota assigned to Chinese banks by the CBRC is negotiable, and may be 
adjusted as the result of ‘window guidance’ meetings (Cousin, 2011). We speculate that the 
case for an increased quota will be strongest if the purpose is to facilitate long-term lending to 
SOEs to permit investment in projects consistent with government policy. Moreover, since 
the quota applies to new lending, banks seeking to maximise the size of their loan book have 
the incentive to make this lending long-term. A similar incentive is absent for lending to 
private firms, since the RRR limits lending as a proportion of existing loans, and any negative 
increase imposed as a penalty is more likely to follow ‘inappropriate’ lending to private firms 
than to SOEs. 
State ownership domination and central control allow state owned banks to discriminate 
against private firms not just in offering loans (Brandt and Li, 2003), but also in offering 
long-term debt. If the above supply-side considerations dominate, there will be a tendency for 
SOEs to employ a larger proportion of long-term debt in their debt maturity structure, while 
privately controlled firms will tend towards employing short-term debt. Accordingly, we 
propose: 
H1: Compared with privately controlled firms, SOEs obtain greater access to long-term 
debt and use less short-term debt. 
The revision and amendment of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Commercial Banks in 2003, requires banks to evaluate a customer’s credit risk and collateral 
in their lending decisions. Li et al. (2009) find that China’s banks have responded to these 
reforms and begun to apply economic criteria in their lending decisions. The links between 
bank finance and subsequent productivity suggest that Chinese banks are somehow able to 
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identify and lend to relatively productive enterprises (Cull and Xu, 2000). Chinese banks 
extend loans to financially healthier and better-governed firms, which implies that the banks 
use commercial judgments in this segment of the market (Firth et al., 2009).  
Irrespective of whether a firm is privately owned or state owned, rational lenders will 
prefer to lend to more creditworthy firms. Such firms tend to be more profitable. To control 
credit risk, banks will avoid long-term lending, which has inherently higher credit risk, to less 
profitable firms. Therefore, if supply-side considerations dominate, we propose: 
H2a: Profitability is an important determinant of the debt maturity structure in Chinese 
firms; firms with higher profitability obtain greater access to long-term debt, while 
firms with lower profitability tend to raise more short-term debt. 
In addition to the above supply-side considerations, agency and signalling theories make 
compatible predictions about a firm’s demand for long-or short-term debt. Barclay and Smith 
(1995) argue that short-term debt can be used to control the interest conflict between the  
lender (principal) and borrower (agent) caused by the borrower rejecting risky, but positive, 
NPV projects that require investment before the firm’s debt matures. This underinvestment 
hypothesis, which predicts that high-growth firms will use a greater proportion of short-term 
debt, is applicable for privately owned firms. However, SOEs are less motivated by the 
objective of maximising shareholder wealth and are likely to invest in projects, consistent 
with social and policy objectives, which have negative NPVs. 
The overinvestment hypothesis predicts that firms with profitable new investments will 
use a smaller proportion of long-term debt. Hart and Moore (1995) argue that short-term debt 
can control the shareholder (principal) – manager (agent) conflict, where managers have the 
incentive to invest in negative NPV projects. We propose that this prediction remains valid 
for privately owned firms. However, managers of SOEs are less concerned about shareholder 
wealth as an objective, and overinvestment would be common whenever the primary 
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motivation of an investment was social or policy objectives. Managers of underperforming 
SOEs will have a greater incentive to avoid monitoring. Moreover, to ensure that 
overinvestment is not curtailed by the lenders, managers of SOEs with poorer investment 
opportunities would seek a longer-term commitment of funds.  
Barclay and Smith (1995) outline a theory where managers use short-term debt to signal 
their firm’s quality to equity markets. High quality firms will pay the higher transaction costs, 
submit to more frequent monitoring, and accept the risk that short-term debt may not be 
rolled over. We argue that because loans to SOEs may not reflect creditworthiness, the 
monitoring role of state banks is compromised. Accordingly, more profitable private firms 
will tend to use more short-term debt; however, this theory offers no prediction with respect 
to SOEs. Thus, from the demand-side consideration, we proposed:  
H2b: Being an SOE decreases the positive effect of firm profitability on long-term debt 
financing; being an SOE intensifies the negative effect of profitability on short-term 
debt financing. 
In a study of unlisted SOEs and foreign firms, Li et al. (2009) find regional differences in 
capital structures. Firms in less-developed regions are more likely to use long term debt. The 
differences are attributed to political connections, where local officials are able to influence 
the lending of the state owned banks (Firth et al., 2009). This may follow where the purpose 
of the loan is to support a project that the officials deem to have a priority. Indeed, as 
Sapienza (2004) suggests, socially maximising governments aim to channel funds to 
depressed areas of the country. China has massive differences in economic development 
across regions.  
Unlike the unlisted firms examined by Li et al. (2009), our focus on listed firms avoids 
the possibility that regional differences in capital structure could be attributed to the increased 
demand for debt caused by a poorer legal environment reducing protections for equity 
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investors. Moreover, other demand-side differences that may be caused by the agency 
relationship between management and shareholders should be independent of the region in 
which the firm operates, because the shares are listed on exchanges in developed regions. 
Therefore, we can attribute any regional differences in the debt maturity structures of SOE 
and privately owned listed to supply-side factors. 
We expect that differences in the institutional environment will differentially affect the 
supply-side determinants of a firm’s debt maturity structure. In lesser-developed regions, the 
influence of political connections in securing long-term funding from the state owned banks 
should be greater. Moreover, the influence of these connections will be more apparent where 
it concerns the operations of SOEs. In an environment where the overall supply of credit is 
constrained by lending quotas we expect a corresponding decrease in the supply of long-term 
debt to privately owned firms. Accordingly, we propose: 
H3: Regional development is an important determinant of the debt maturity structure in 
Chinese firms; banks are more likely to support SOEs in low-developed areas with 
long-term debt and privately controlled firms in low-developed areas with short-term 
debt. 
 
3. Sample selection and variable construction 
3.1. Sample selection 
The sample pool consists of all publicly traded Chinese firms that only issue A shares on 
the Shanghai Security Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Security Exchange (SZSE). The firms 
issuing both A shares and B shares or both A shares and H shares are required to apply 
international financial reporting standards, rather than Chinese financial reporting standards. 
We exclude firms with foreign ownership to avoid the difference in financing policy and 
accounting issues, as is common practice in sample selection. Our sample period commences 
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in 2001, when Chinese companies implemented the New Accounting Standards and Policies. 
Although the new accounting standards have been revised in 2006, the variables involved in 
this study remain consistent before and after the revision. Our study concludes in 2008, when 
the global financial crisis occurred and the Chinese stock market fell sharply. We choose 
2001–2008 as our sample period to mitigate the influences of changing accounting policies 
and the financial crisis. 
We exclude firms with ST and PT2 status, firms in the financial and insurance industries, 
and firms with incomplete datasets, from our analysis. We define the ownership control type 
in terms of the nature of the ultimate controller. If the ultimate controller of a firm is the state 
for all of the observation period (2001–2008), this firm is defined as an SOE; if the ultimate 
controller is a civilian (a natural or legal person, with the firm belonging to individuals) for 
all of the observation period, it is defined as a privately owned enterprise. To have a clean 
sample, we omit companies that transferred from state control (SOE) to private control or 
from private control to SOE in this period. Other types of controlling ownership, such as 
collective ownership, social group ownership and employee ownership, are somewhat 
ambiguous, lying somewhere between state and private ownership, where the controlling 
ownership could be either private entities or the government (Allen et al., 2005; Li et al., 
2009). We eliminate several firms with such ambiguous types of controlling ownership from 
the study. 
All of the raw data related to corporate finance and governance are extracted from the 
China Center for Economic Research (CCER) database, which is developed by the Beijing 
Sinofin Information Service Limited Company. We supplement the data from annual reports 
available from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange websites. We exclude 
observations with missing terms or suspected errors. We also exclude outliers, such as when 
Tobin’s Q is greater than 10.3 The final sample consists of 5,924 firm-year observations of 
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publicly listed firms during 2001–2008, in which 4,646 firm-years are SOEs and 1,278 are 
privately controlled firms. 
3.2. Variable construction 
3.2.1. Dependant and analytical variables 
We use two variables to measure the debt maturity structure: long-term debt dummy 
(LTD dummy), which is set to 1 if the firm has long-term debt in a specific year and 0 
otherwise; short-term debt ratio (STD), which is short-term borrowings from banks or other 
financial institutions divided by the total debt. As general practice, the long-term debt that 
matures within 12-months is counted as short-term debt rather than log-term debt. The total 
debt is calculated as long-term debt plus short-term debt.4 
The variable STATE is used to denote the type of ownership control for listed companies. 
It is set to 1 if the company’s controlling shareholder is the state and 0 if it is a legal or 
natural person without government involvement. Following Chen et al. (2009), we use three 
variables to measure firm profitability: return on assets (ROA), which is the operating 
earnings divided by the average book value of total assets; return on sales (ROS), which is 
the operating earnings divided by the net sales; and cash flow return on assets (CFOA), which 
is the operating cash flow divided by the average book value of total assets. These three 
measures of profitability consider both accounting income and cash flow income. We use the 
marketisation index (MARKET), developed by Fan et al. (2010), as the measurement of the 
regional economic development and institutional efficiency. Higher scores on the index 
indicate a relatively high level of economic development and institutional efficiency. 
3.2.2. Control variables 
After reviewing the relevant literature, we include the following control variables in our 
analysis.  Managerial ownership (MO) is the ratio of all board members’ ownership stake to 
total ownership of the firm (Cho, 1998; Davies et al., 2005). Empirical evidence shows that 
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managers with higher stock ownership use a larger proportion of short-maturity debt, thus 
committing to more frequent monitoring. Conversely, more entrenched managers who have 
lower stock ownership may choose longer-maturity debt. Growth opportunity (Q) is 
measured by using Tobin’s Q (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Cai et al., 2008). A firm’s growth 
opportunities affect its choice of debt maturity structure because managers may have an 
incentive to overinvest and the agency cost is likely to be higher for firms in high-growth 
industries (Titman and Wessels, 1988).  
Banks secure their lending, particularly long-term debt, against a firm’s collateral assets. 
We use the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets (PPE) as the measure of 
collateral assets (Pittman and Fortin, 2004). The decision to choose long- or short-term debt 
might also be affected by a firm’s tax position, since the debt maturity structure may affect 
the amount and timing of tax payments (Wu and Yue, 2009). We use depreciation scaled by 
total assets as a non-debt tax shield (DEPR). In addition, we also include the logarithm of 
total assets (SIZE) to capture the effect of firm size, leverage in previous year (PreLEV) to 
mitigate endogenous problems relating to capital structure, year dummy (YEAR) to control 
for policy effects and industry dummy (INDUSTRY) to allow for differences across 
industries.   
3.3. Summary of statistics 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the main variables in the 5,924 observations in 
our sample. It shows that the probability of holding long-term debt (the mean value of the 
LTD dummy) for Chinese listed companies is 80.9 percent, while the mean proportion of 
short-term debt in total liabilities is 33.7 percent. On average, the government ultimately 
controls 78.4 percent (STATE) of the firms in our sample. Firms in our sample have an 
average leverage ratio of 44.9 percent, which remains stable over time (Wu and Yue, 2009). 
The distribution of managerial ownership is highly skewed, with a mean of 2.5 percent and 
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the maximum of 77.9 percent which reflect a predominance of small managerial shareholders. 
Marketisation is lowest for Tibet in 2001, with an index score of 0.33 and at 11.71, highest 
for Shanghai in 2007. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Univariate analysis 
First, we compare the mean and median of debt maturity structure variables to test 
whether there are significant differences between SOEs and private enterprises. Table 2 
shows the number of listed privately controlled firms increased faster than the number of 
SOEs. From 2001 to 2008, the number of SOEs increased by approximately 25 percent (from 
484 to 604), while privately controlled firms increased by approximately three times (from 73 
in 2001 to 289 in 2008). Of particular note is that from 2006 to 2007, the numbers of SOEs 
and privately controlled firms increased by 12 percent (from 622 to 694 firms) and 48 percent 
(from 182 to 270 firms), respectively. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Panel A (Panel B) of Table 2 compares the means (medians) of the state-owned firms 
with the privately owned firms for each year.  The statistical significant of these differences is 
assessed using the t-test (Mann–Whitney U-test). The results show that between the two 
groups, both the long-term debt dummy and short-term debt ratio differ significantly. For the 
full sample, the means of the LTD dummies are significantly larger for SOEs than for 
privately controlled firms. For example, the mean LTD dummy in SOEs in 2001 is 81.2 
percent, which is significantly higher than 65.8 percent of private firms in the same year. The 
probability of holding long-term debt over the eight-year period was 84.0 percent for SOEs, 
which is significantly larger than the 69.4 percent for privately controlled firms.  
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Relative to privately controlled firms, both the means and medians of the STD variable 
show that SOEs use significantly less short-term debt. For example, the mean (median) STD 
for SOEs in 2001 is 35.5 percent (37.7 percent), which is significantly less than for privately 
controlled firms at 43.8 percent (47.7 percent). Considering the weak interest alignment 
between shareholders and managers in SOEs (Ruan et al., 2011), the difference of debt 
maturity variables between SOEs and privately controlled firms supports the notion that 
managers in Chinese listed SOEs prefer long-term debt to reduce the frequency  of external 
monitoring, such as that from banks.  
In Table 3, Panels A and B show the mean/median comparison of the LTD dummy and 
STD variable grouped by each of the profitability measures in turn. We partition our sample 
into quartiles and compare the lowest and highest quartile for each profitability measure. 
There are approximately 1,481 observations in each pair of extreme quartile sub-samples. 
The differences in the mean (median) STD for the high and low profitability groups are 
significant in both panels, with firms in the lowest profitability quartile using more short-term 
debt. This echoes Cai et al. (2008) who find that the ability to access long-term debt may 
signal a Chinese firm’s good quality because banks prefer to lend long-term debt to profitable 
firms. Firms with poorer performance receive more short-term debt. Better-performing firms 
use less short-term debt. The results lend further support to the supply-side explanation for 
Hypothesis 2a—that listed companies with lower profitability raise more short-term debt. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
We also categorise firms according to their locations, and show the comparative results in 
Table 4. If the marketisation index of a firm located region is smaller (larger) than the mean 
of 7.749, the firm located in this region is assigned to the low- (high-) institution group. We 
then compare the LTD dummy and STD between two different institutional groups for SOEs 
and private firms respectively. In Panel A, there are 2,607 SOEs located in low-institution 
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areas and 2,039 SOEs located in high-institution areas. The mean and median of the LTD 
dummy for SOEs between these two institutional groups are significantly different. Banks are 
more likely to support the SOEs located in low-developed areas with long-term debt. In Panel 
B, there are 407 privately controlled firms located in low-institution areas and 871 firms in 
high-institution areas. There is no significant difference for the LTD dummy between these 
two groups. That is, for private firms, access to the LTD is unaffected by the marketisation of 
the region. However, the differences for the STD are significant. Banks are more likely to 
support privately controlled firms located in low-developed areas with short-term debt. These 
comparison results provide evidence supporting Hypothesis 3 that banks are more disposed to 
support SOEs in low-developed areas with long-term debt, and privately controlled firms in 
low-developed areas with short-term debt. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.2. Regression analysis 
To further examine the determinants of Chinese firms’ choice of debt maturity structure, 
we use regression analysis5. Equation (1) expresses the proposed determinants of the debt 
maturity structure in Chinese listed companies: 
1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
' '
*
( ) ( )
it i it i it
it it it it it it it
t i it
Debtmaturity STATE Profitability STATE Profitability
MARK PreLEV MO Q DEPR PPE SIZE
Yeardummies Industrydummies
α β β β
β β β β β β β
θ γ ε
= + + +
+ + + + + + +
+ + +
  (1) 
For firm i in year t, the dependant variable Debtmaturity refers to the short-term debt ratio 
(STD) when OLS is  employed, or to the likelihood of having long-term debt (LTD dummy) 
when the Logit model is used. The results of Equation (1) are shown in Table 5. In Panels A 
and B, the dependant variables are the LTD dummy and STD respectively. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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In both panels of Table 5, the STATE dummy is significantly associated with the debt 
maturity measures in all specifications. In Panel A, the coefficient is positive, consistent with 
our earlier discussion regarding the role of government in firms’ borrowing and banks’ 
lending decisions. In Panel B, the negative relationship between the STD and STATE 
provides evidence that short-term debt is not the main tool for monitoring management in 
SOEs. That is, consistent with Hypothesis 1, SOEs have greater access to long-term debt and 
use less short-term debt than privately controlled firms. 
In Panel A, both the ROA and ROS are positively related to access to long-term debt. 
Therefore, firms with better profitability have greater access to long-term debt, which is 
consistent with Firth et al. (2009). In Panel B, the profitability variables ROA and CFOA are 
negatively related to the short-term debt ratio. This relation provides evidence in support of 
Hypothesis 2a: banks prefer to provide long-term loans to firms with better profitability, and 
firms with lower profitability raise more short-term debt. 
In some specifications, the statistically negative coefficient on the interaction of the 
STATE and profitability variables in Panel A of Table 5, offers some support for Hypothesis 
2b: that being an SOE decreases the effect of firms’ profitability on firms’ access to long-
term debt. However, in specifications including the control variables, the significance of the 
interaction is reduced. Stronger support for Hypothesis 2b is obtained from Panel B. The 
statistically negative coefficients on the interaction term shows that relative to privately 
owned firms, the proportion of short-term debt decreases more strongly as the firms’ 
profitability increases when the firm is state-owned. Moreover, the coefficient on the CFOA 
interactive term is robust to the addition of the control variables. Accordingly, we conclude 
that being an SOE intensifies the negative effect of profitability on the proportion of short-
term debt financing. For China’s listed companies, although bank reform has promoted the 
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banks’ incentive and ability to lend according to the borrower’s profitability, government 
involvement in the financial markets can still induce a misallocation of financial resources.  
Both the negative coefficients of MARKET in Panel A and positive coefficients in Panel 
B are significant at one percent. This shows that institutional efficiency associated with the 
relative development of the regional economy affects long-term debt financing negatively, 
and short-term debt financing positively, which is consistent with Firth et al. (2009) and Li et 
al. (2009). We consider the effect of marketisation on the debt maturity of SOEs and 
privately controlled firms in more detail in the following subsection.   
It is apparent from the similarity of the coefficients on many of the control variables to 
those found in studies in developed markets that some determinants of the debt maturity 
structure for Chinese firms common to both markets. For example, the leverage ratio is a 
common measurement of financial risk. The leverage ratio in the previous year (PreLEV) 
significantly affects both the LTD dummy and the STD. Managerial ownership (MO) plays 
an important role in a firm’s short-term debt decisions, which is consistent with Datta et al. 
(2005). The significant negative effect of MO on the STD supports the notion that short-term 
debt is a tool for reducing the agency cost between shareholders and managers in Chinese 
privately controlled enterprises. Firms with larger-scale operations tend to use a higher 
proportion of long-term debt and a lower proportion of short-term debt, which is consistent 
with Titman and Wessels (1988), Cai et al. (2008) and Berger et al. (2009). 
4.3. Split-sample analysis according to control ownership 
To further investigate of the effects of marketisation on the debt maturity structure, we 
split the sample into two groups and conduct separate regression analyses for SOEs and 
privately controlled firms. We control for industry effects using industry-adjusted 
profitability (IAProfitability) (industry-adjusted return on assets (IAROA), industry-adjusted 
return on sales (IAROS), or industry-adjusted cash flow on assets (IACFOA)), where the 
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industry medians are deducted from the raw numbers, giving relative performance measures. 
The regression equation is shown as: 
1 2 3 4 5
'
6 7 8 ( )
it it it it it it
it it it t it
Debtmaturity IAProfitability MARK PreLEV MO Q
DEPR PPE SIZE Yeardummies
α β β β β β
β β β θ ε
= + + + + +
+ + + + +
 (2) 
Panel A of Table 6 shows that the effect of industry-adjusted profitability on firms’ access 
to long-term debt in private firms is greater than in SOEs in most specifications. For example, 
the difference between the coefficients for IAROA in private firms and SOEs is significant at 
the 10 percent level. As a complement to the conclusions of Firth et al. (2009) regarding the 
importance of commercial judgment in banks’ lending decisions, we present evidence that the 
banking sector uses profitability as a major determinant of loan allocations to privately 
controlled corporations. Banks tend to lend more long-term debt to better-performing private 
firms. However, this allocation criterion does not appear to be as effective in SOEs. 
Therefore, we provide further support for Hypothesis 2b: that state control ownership 
decreases the effects of firm profitability on long-term debt financing. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The institutional development variable (MARKET) is significantly related to the debt 
characteristic variables in nearly all specifications in both panels. In Panel A, listed SOEs 
located in less-developed regions have significantly greater access to long-term debt; 
moreover, the negative relationship between institutional development and access to long-
term debt is stronger for SOEs than for privately controlled enterprises. However, as Panel B 
shows, for SOEs, the proportion of short term debt (STD) employed is unrelated to 
institutional development. In contrast, the significantly negative coefficient (Market) shows 
that private firms operating in less-developed regions employ more STD relative to those in 
more-developed regions. Therefore, we find support for Hypothesis 3: that banks tend to 
provide long-term debt to SOEs located in low-developed areas and are more likely to 
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support privately controlled firms located in low-developed areas with short-term debt. This 
is another example of ‘bank discrimination’ in China. 
 
5. Robustness test 
5.1 Impact of state ownership 
State ownership has dominated the Chinese economy for decades and private 
ownership has significantly increased its role in Chinese economy. Although the ideological 
discrimination against private ownership in China is waning, it remains prevalent. Cognizant 
of our finding that SOEs have greater access to long-term loans, we conjecture that high state 
ownership is an advantage for access long-term loans regardless of whether the firm is 
actually controlled by the state. To examine this conjecture, we use the state ownership ratio 
as an independent variable to investigate its effect on the debt maturity. The results support 
our conjecture that firms with higher levels of state ownership tend to use a larger proportion 
long-term debt and less short-term debt6. 
5.2 Impact of new bank law 
In early 2003, the China State Council announced the establishment of the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC). By the end of year, the Tenth National Peoples’ Congress 
approved the revision of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks. 
We conjecture that these regulations would significantly affect banks’ lending behavior. 
Therefore, we run separate models for the years 2001-2003 and 2004-2008. The results show 
no significant difference in the effect of profitability on debt maturity structures between the 
two periods. This suggests that the response to the new policies aimed at improving the 
lending practices of Chinese banks is subdued. Therefore, we do not address this regulation 
issue in context. 
5.3 Alternative variables 
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In the tests in Section 4, we use after-tax return to calculate the profitability variables. As 
operating earnings are calculated before interest payments, the effect of leverage on earnings 
numbers may be reduced. To address this issue, we use operating earnings (before tax) on 
equity (hereafter ROE) as an alternative variable for profitability. We also use earnings price 
ratio, which is the profitability variable most affected by the market aspects of listed 
companies. These tests do not materially alter the results we obtain from ROA, ROS and 
CFOA. For brevity, these results are not reported. We also use equity ownership of firms’ 
controlling interests following Li et al. (2009), but again these results do not alter this study’s 
conclusions.  
In addition, using the standard from “China’s Western Development Policy” promulgated 
by the Chinese Government , we separate companies into two groups by coding a firm as “1” 
if it is located in relatively poorly developed western China, and “0” if the firm is situated in 
relatively highly developed eastern China. The analysis results are similar to those obtained 
using the marketisation index. We also re-estimate the equation (2) with raw profitability 
variables that are not adjusted by industry: ROA, ROS and CFOA. The results have no 
substantial differences.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In developing countries, many banks are state-owned, and a large proportion of their 
credit goes to SOEs, but the effect of SOEs on credit allocation in China is even more 
pronounced (Cull and Xu, 2000). Cai et al. (2008) investigate the potential determinants of 
the debt maturity of Chinese listed firms by considering corporate ownership and governance, 
but do not refer the impact of ownership control types. This study extends Cai et al. (2008) to 
examine the impact of ownership control types on firms’ debt maturity choices.  
We find that the type of ownership control is an important factor affecting listed firms’ 
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debt maturity structures. Firms controlled by the state have greater access to long-term debt 
and employ proportionately less short-term debt. In contrast, firms controlled by individuals 
have restricted access to long-term debt, while short-term debt remains an economically 
important financing source for them. When we examine whether the banks screen borrowers 
based on the firm’s profitability, we find that firms with better profitability use a significantly 
lower proportion of short-term debt. This is the reverse of that predicted by signalling theory 
that is applicable in developed markets, and more consistent with supply-side constraints on 
long-term debt. The use of long-term debt increases with profitability; however, we find 
some evidence that state ownership control reduces the magnitude of the positive relation 
between profitability and the firms’ access to long-term debt. This finding supports the 
contention that although China’s state-owned banks are screening borrowers on a commercial 
basis, government involvement in financial markets can still produce a misallocation of 
financial resources.  
Finally, this study supplements the literature pointing to a ‘bank discrimination’ problem 
in China. The empirical results suggest that banks are more likely to support SOEs with long-
term debt and privately controlled companies with short-term debt in low-developed areas. 
Beyond Brandt and Li (2003), we find that China’s state-owned banks have also 
discriminated against privately controlled firms in the form of long-term loans. 
                                                 
1 The high level of bad debts on the balance sheets of state owned banks were reduced by their transfer to 
asset management companies that were established for this purpose (Shan and Xu, 2012).  
2 The financial distressed firms have been classified by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) as 
‘special treatment’ (ST) or ‘particular transfer’ (PT) firms. If a listed firm records a loss in two consecutive 
years, it will be designated as a ST firm. If it continues to produce losses for a third year, it will be designated a 
PT firm. A PT firm will be delisted if it does not become profitable in the following year. 
3 To deal with the outlier of Tobin’s Q, we borrow the idea from Baker and Wurgler (2002), who eliminate 
observations with market to book ratio larger than 10. Both Tobin’s Q and market to book ratio represent growth 
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opportunity and their values are similar in some extent.  
4 In our definition and calculation, long-term debt ratio + short-term debt ratio = 1 (i.e., LTD +STD = 1). Thus, 
the coefficients and t-values of the independent variables in the regression on dependent variable of STD are 
equal to those of correspondent independent variables in the regression on dependent variable of LTD in 
absolute value, but opposite in sign. From the regression on STD, we can deduce the results of the regression 
with LTD as the dependent variable. Also, due to the underdeveloped debt markets in China, banks are the main 
sources of debt financing for firms (Cai et al. 2008). Among our sample companies, only a few received a small 
proportion of their loans from non-bank financial intermediaries. We believe the loans from non-bank financial 
intermediaries do not bias our results. 
5 All the correlation coefficients are small, although four of them are between 0.314 and 0.543. The largest VIF 
value is 1.61, substantially smaller than the critical level of 10. Therefore, multicollinearity is not a concern in 
this study. The tabulated correlation coefficient matrix and VIF diagnostic results are available upon request.   
6 The tabulated results are available upon request. 
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Table 1 Summary of statistics  
 Minimum 25th percentile Mean 75th percentile Maximum Std dev. 
LTD dummy 0 1 0.809 1 1 0.393 
STD 0 0.162 0.337 0.497 0.969 0.217 
STATE 0 1 0.784 1 1 0.411 
LEV 0.015 0.310 0.449 0.566 0.966 0.173 
ROA 0 0.011 0.038 0.053 0.340 0.039 
ROS 0 0 0.063 0.086 2.712 0.107 
CFOA -0.597 0.022 0.065 0.110 0.724 0.087 
MO 0 0 0.025 0 0.779 0.100 
DEPR 0 0.032 0.108 0.183 1.370 0.133 
PPE 0.022 0.342 0.472 0.591 0.960 0.171 
Q 0 0.807 1.201 1.305 9.873 0.698 
SIZE 8.158 9.014 9.337 9.595 12.077 0.469 
MARKET 0.330 6.060 7.749 9.450 11.710 2.181 
The sample consists of 5,924 firm-year observations for the firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges from 2001 to 2008. LTD dummy is long-term debt dummy, STD is short-term debt ratio, STATE is 
state ownership control dummy, LEV is leverage ratio, ROA is return on assets, ROS is return on sale, CFOA is 
cash flow return on assets, MO is managerial ownership ratio, DERP is non-debt tax shield, PPE is property and 
plant and equipment to total assets, Q is Tobin’s Q, SIZE is the logarithm of the total asset, MARKET is 
marketization index.  
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Table 2 Comparison of debt maturity structure between SOEs and privately controlled firms 
 
 Obs LTD dummy STD 
 SOEs Private SOEs Private t/Z SOEs Private t/Z 
Panel A: Value of means and test in difference (t-test in means, 2-tailed) 
2001 484 73 0.812 0.658 3.05*** 0.355 0.438 -3.09*** 
2002 521 77 0.823 0.675 3.10*** 0.332 0.413 -3.07*** 
2003 549 100 0.851 0.780     1.77* 0.341 0.420 -3.23*** 
2004 599 145 0.851 0.752 2.89*** 0.336 0.401 -3.27*** 
2005 573 142 0.871 0.725 4.30*** 0.323 0.411 -4.38*** 
2006 622 182 0.888 0.808 2.82*** 0.303 0.376 -4.12*** 
2007 694 270 0.821 0.652 5.74*** 0.313 0.374 -4.05*** 
2008 604 289 0.801 0.602 6.47*** 0.294 0.361 -4.36*** 
Total 4646 1278 0.840 0.694 11.91*** 0.323 0.388 -9.55*** 
Panel B: Value of medians and test in difference (Mann-Whitney U-test in medians,2-tailed) 
2001 484 73 1 1 3.03*** 0.377 .477 -2.83*** 
2002 521 77 1 1 3.06*** 0.330 .425 -2.89*** 
2003 549 100 1 1     1.77* 0.342 .419 -3.16*** 
2004 599 145 1 1 2.88*** 0.331 .351 -3.20*** 
2005 573 142 1 1 4.25*** 0.313 .437 -4.16*** 
2006 622 182 1 1 2.81*** 0.295 .391 -4.00*** 
2007 694 270 1 1 5.65*** 0.311 .371 -3.81*** 
2008 604 289 1 1 6.32*** 0.276 .388 -4.08*** 
Total 4646 1278 1 1 11.77*** 0.319 .401 -9.07*** 
The sample consists of 5,924 firm-year observations for the firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges from 2001 to 2008. LTD dummy is long-term debt dummy, STD is short-term debt 
ratio, ‘Private’ represents privately controlled firms. SOEs represents state controlled firms, *** and * 
are significant at the 1 and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed).  
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Table 3 Comparison of debt maturity structure between firms grouped by profitability 
 LTD dummy STD 
 25% lowest 25% highest t/Z 25% lowest 25% highest t/Z 
Panel A: Mean comparison 
ROA 0.803 0.803   0.00    0.377     0.272 13.16*** 
ROS 0.747 0.800        -3.47*** 0.326 0.307 2.34** 
CFOA 0.801    0.809 -0.56 0.388     0.270 15.10*** 
Panel B: Median comparison 
ROA 1 1  0.00   0.386    0.245 13.273*** 
ROS 1 1       -3.47*** 0.327 0.291        2.993*** 
CFOA 1    1       -0.56 0.400   0.245 14.716*** 
The sample consists of 5,924 firm-year observations for the firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges from 2001 to 2008. LTD dummy is long-term debt dummy, STD is short-term debt 
ratio, ROA is return on assets, ROS is return on sale, CFOA is cash flow return on assets, ‘25% lowest’ 
refers to the sub-samples consisting of firms with the value of profitability lower than the value of the 
25th percentile of all observations, ‘25% highest’ refers to the sub-samples consisting of firms with the 
value of profitability higher than the value of the 75th percentile of all observations, t values for mean 
comparison. Z values for median comparison. ***, ** and * are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels respectively. 
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Table 4 Comparison of debt maturity structure for SOEs and privately controlled firms grouped by 
institutional development 
The sample consists of 5,924 firm-year observations for the firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges from 2001 to 2008. LTD dummy is long-term debt dummy, STD is short-term debt 
ratio, ‘Private’ represents privately controlled firms, SOEs represents state controlled firms, ‘Low’ 
refers to the firms’ locations where the marketisation index is lower than the mean value, ‘High’ refers 
to the firms’ locations where the marketisation index is higher than the mean value. ***, ** and * are 
significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed).  
 
Obs. LTD dummy STD 
Low High Low High t/Z Low High t/Z 
Panel A:  SOEs 
Mean 
2607 2039 
0.857 0.819 3.58*** 0.329 0.317  1.82* 
Median 1 1 3.58*** 0.331 0.305 2.33** 
Panel B:  Private 
Mean 
407 871 
0.703 0.690 0.46 0.428 0.370  4.26*** 
Median 1 1 0.65 0.436 0.386  4.19*** 
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Table 5 Results of regressions on debt maturity with firm ownership, profitability and marketisation 
Panel A: Logit regression, LTD dummy as dependent variable (z-test) 
Constant 0.698*** 
(8.44) 
-12.398*** 
(-11.83) 
0.720*** 
(9.41) 
-12.257*** 
(-11.70) 
0.850*** 
(11.98) 
-12.614*** 
(-12.08) 
STATE 0.972*** 
(9.67) 
0.318*** 
(2.65) 
0.951*** 
(10.66) 
0.265** 
(2.31) 
0.813*** 
(9.28) 
0.227** 
(2.08) 
ROA 3.050** 
(2.09) 
4.433*** 
(2.65)     
STATE*ROA -3.313* 
(-1.83) 
-2.756 
(-1.42)     
ROS   1.905** (2.05) 
1.851* 
(1.72)   
STATE*ROS   -2.063** (-2.09) 
-1.078 
(-1.00)   
CFOA     -0.586 (-0.86) 
-0.255 
(-0.33) 
STATE*CFOA     0.548 (0.67) 
-0.518 
(-0.55) 
MARKET  -0.106*** (-5.17)  
-0.103*** 
(-5.01)  
-0.104*** 
(-5.07) 
PreLEV  3.579*** (14.27)  
3.614*** 
(14.12)  
3.417*** 
(14.07) 
MO  0.039 (0.12)  
0.135 
(0.42)  
0.148 
(0.46) 
Q  -0.107* (-1.83)  
-0.091 
(-1.59)  
-0.075 
(-1.12) 
DEPR  0.754* (1.72)  
0.772* 
(1.77)  
0.789* 
(1.79) 
PPE  0.384* (1.66)  
0.348 
(1.50)  
0.353 
(1.52) 
SIZE  1.378*** (12.48)  
1.361*** 
(12.29)  
1.417*** 
(12.87) 
YEAR  Yes  Yes  Yes 
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs 5924 5924 5924 5924 5924 5924 
Pseudo R2 0.023  0.163 0.023 0.163 0.022 0.162 
Panel B: Ordinary least squares regression, STD as dependent variable (t-test) 
Constant 0.426*** 
(53.12) 
1.095*** 
(17.16) 
0.389*** 
(51.68) 
1.227*** 
(18.88) 
0.405*** 
(59.24) 
1.142*** 
(17.93) 
STATE -0.054*** 
(-5.91) 
-0.081*** 
(-8.68) 
-0.060*** 
(-7.15) 
-.083*** 
(-9.25) 
-0.043*** 
(-5.48) 
-0.070*** 
(-8.20) 
ROA -0.931*** 
(-6.98) 
-1.204*** 
(-8.93)     
STATE*ROA -0.369** 
(-2.35) 
-0.176 
(-1.17)     
ROS   -0.043 (-0.51) 
-0.081 
(-0.93)   
STATE*ROS   -0.070 (-0.78) 
0.086 
(0.98)   
CFOA     -0.315* (-4.81) 
-0.313*** 
(-5.01) 
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STATE*CFOA     -0.242*** (-3.23) 
-0.209*** 
(-2.93) 
MARKET  0.005*** (3.32)  
0.005*** 
(3.06)  
0.005*** 
(3.21) 
PreLEV  0.231*** (13.40)  
0.312*** 
(17.55)  
0.292*** 
(17.56) 
MO  -0.162*** (-5.91)  
-0.212*** 
(-7.62)  
-0.212*** 
(-7.77) 
Q  -0.001 (-0.29)  
-0.015*** 
(-3.01)  
-0.004 
(-0.80) 
DEPR  -0.016 (-0.62)  
-0.023 
(-0.86)  
0.056** 
(2.08) 
PPE  0.104*** (6.24)  
0.109*** 
(6.38)  
0.102*** 
(6.09) 
SIZE  -0.095*** (-14.37)  
-0.112*** 
(-16.55)  
-0.101*** 
(-15.28) 
YEAR  Yes  Yes  Yes 
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs      5924 5924 5924 5924 5924 5924 
Adj. R2 0.062  0.141 0.020 0.125  0.057 0.158 
The sample consists of 5,924 firm-year observations for the firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges from 2001 to 2008. LTD dummy is long-term debt dummy, STD is short-term debt 
ratio, STATE is state ownership control dummy, ROA is return on assets, ROS is return on sale, CFOA 
is cash flow return on assets, MARKET is marketization index, PreLEV is leverage ratio in prior year, 
MO is managerial ownership ratio, Q is Tobin’s Q, DERP is non-debt tax shield, PPE is property and 
plant and equipment to total assets, SIZE is the logarithm of the total asset, YEAR is yearly dummy, 
INDUSTRY is industry dummy. ***, ** and * are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 6 Results of regressions on debt maturity with firm ownership, profitability and marketisation for 
firms grouped by ownership control types 
 SOEs Private firms Diff. 
 SOEs Private firms Diff. 
 SOEs Private firms Diff. 
 Panel A: Logit regression, LTD dummy as dependent variable (z-test) 
IAROA 2.480* (1.95) 
6.538*** 
(3.76) 
-4.058* 
(0.060)         
IAROS     0.811* (1.77) 
3.235*** 
(2.68) 
-2.424* 
(0.060)     
IACFOA         -0.948* (-1.73) 
-0.328 
(-0.43) 
-0.620 
(0.507) 
MARKET -0.134*** (-6.38) 
-0.058* 
(-1.73) 
-0.076* 
(0.052)  
-0.136*** 
(-6.47) 
-0.036 
(-1.03) 
-0.100** 
(0.013)  
-0.139*** 
(-6.67) 
-0.060* 
(-1.80) 
-0.079** 
(0.042) 
PreLEV 3.715*** (12.86) 
3.534*** 
(7.43) 
0.181 
(0.745)  
3.750*** 
(12.70) 
3.470*** 
(7.27) 
0.280 
(0.618)  
3.558*** 
(12.64) 
3.225*** 
(6.91) 
0.333 
(0.541) 
MO 5.381** (2.08) 
-.280 
(-0.83) 
5.661** 
(0.030)  
5.691** 
(2.21) 
-0.140 
(-0.42) 
5.831** 
(0.025)  
5.952** 
(2.32) 
-0.122 
(-0.37) 
6.074** 
(0.019) 
Q -0.084 (-1.39) 
-0.183** 
(-2.28) 
0.099 
(0.328)  
-0.067 
(-1.11) 
-0.171** 
(-2.11) 
0.104 
(0.306)  
-0.059 
(-0.95) 
-0.197** 
(-2.43) 
0.138 
(0.175) 
DEPR 1.622*** (3.90) 
0.589 
(0.46) 
1.033 
(0.446)  
1.722*** 
(4.21) 
1.034 
(0.79) 
0.688 
(0.617)  
1.973*** 
(4.68) 
2.662** 
(2.17) 
-0.689 
(0.595) 
TANG 0.580** (2.12) 
0.282 
(0.67) 
0.298 
(0.551)  
0.538** 
(1.98) 
0.240 
(0.57) 
0.298 
(0.552)  
0.532** 
(1.96) 
0.075 
(0.18) 
0.457 
(0.357) 
SIZE 1.457*** (11.91) 
.990*** 
(4.42) 
0.467* 
(0.067)  
1.447*** 
(11.82) 
0.965*** 
(4.34) 
0.482* 
(0.058)  
1.503*** 
(12.18) 
0.957*** 
(4.31) 
0.546** 
(0.032) 
Obs. 4646 1278 5924  4646 1278 5924  4646 1278 5924 
Pseudo R2 0.137 0.112 0.149  0.137 0.108 0.148  0.137 0.103 0.146 
 Panel B: Ordinary least squares regression, STD as dependent variable (t-test) 
 IAROA -1.081*** (-12.66) 
-1.120*** 
(-7.29) 
0.039 
(0.819)       
 IAROS    0.010 (0.38) 
-0.278*** 
(-2.66) 
0.288*** 
(0.005)    
 IACFOA       -0.489*** (-13.92) 
-0.310*** 
(-4.46) 
-0.179** 
(0.015) 
 MARKET -0.001 (0.10) 
-0.015*** 
(-5.02) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(1.42) 
-0.016*** 
(-5.06) 
0.018*** 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(1.17) 
-0.013*** 
(-4.31) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
 PreLEV 0.232*** (12.38) 
0.245*** 
(5.76) 
-0.013 
(0.774) 
0.296*** 
(15.38) 
0.272*** 
(6.29) 
0.024 
(0.594) 
0.276*** 
(15.23) 
0.282*** 
(6.60) 
-0.006 
(0.892) 
 MO -0.550*** (-2.62) 
-0.101*** 
(-3.14) 
-0.449** 
(0.038) 
-0.729*** 
(-3.42) 
-0.132*** 
(-4.07) 
-0.597*** 
(0.007) 
-0.674*** 
(-3.23) 
-0.137*** 
(-4.25) 
-0.537** 
(0.013) 
 Q -0.010** (-2.02) 
-0.006 
(-0.76) 
-0.004 
(0.663) 
-0.012** 
(-2.37) 
-0.005 
(-0.64) 
-0.007 
(0.462) 
-0.001 
(-0.11) 
0.002 
(0.26) 
-0.003 
(0.768) 
 DEPR 0.077*** (3.22) 
0.504*** 
(4.42) 
-0.427*** 
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.25) 
0.324*** 
(2.76) 
-0.318*** 
(0.005) 
0.086*** 
(3.63) 
0.287*** 
(2.63) 
-0.201* 
(0.053) 
 TANG 0.096*** (5.18) 
0.111*** 
(2.90) 
-0.015 
(0.782) 
0.105*** 
(5.59) 
0.125*** 
(3.21) 
-0.02 
(0.626) 
0.104*** 
(5.63) 
0.123*** 
(3.18) 
-0.019 
(0.633) 
 SIZE -0.114*** (-17.10) 
-0.068*** 
(-3.50) 
-0.046** 
(0.015) 
-0.122*** 
(-17.97) 
-0.064*** 
(-3.25) 
-0.058*** 
(0.003) 
-0.108*** 
(-16.12) 
-0.058*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.05*** 
(0.009) 
 Obs. 4646 1278 5924 4646 1278 5924 4646 1278 5924 
 Adj. R2 0.130 0.130 0.749 0.100 0.100 0.740 0.136 0.108 0.748 
The sample consists of 5,924 firm-year observations for the firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 
2001 to 2008. LTD dummy is long-term debt dummy, STD is short-term debt ratio, IAROA is industry adjusted return on 
assets, IAROS is industry adjusted return on sale, IACFOA is industry adjusted cash flow return on assets, MARKET is 
marketization index, PreLEV is leverage ratio in prior year, MO is managerial ownership ratio, Q is Tobin’s Q, DERP is 
non-debt tax shield, PPE is property and plant and equipment to total assets, SIZE is the logarithm of the total asset. ***, 
** and * are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. For Panel A, z values are in parentheses for the 
columns of SOEs and ‘Private firms’; p values are in parentheses for columns of ‘Diff’. For Panel B, t values are in 
parentheses for the columns of SOEs and ‘Private firms’; p values are in parentheses for columns of ‘Diff’. ***, ** and * 
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are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Differences of coefficient are tested for significance using 
the chow-test. All of the constants and year dummies in the regressions and are omitted in the table for the sake of 
brevity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
